Public service broadcasting model in Indonesian transitional democracy

Masduki
Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

ABSTRACT

The emergence of the public service broadcasting (PSB) system in post-authoritarian countries in Asia, including Indonesia (after the 1998 political reform), is not in line with the aspiration of the democratic media system. Most public-oriented broadcasters were born as a hybrid of universal and ideal models of a democratic channel with local and transitional media systems. This research aims to map PSB models rooted in different countries and it particularly examines the efforts made by Indonesian stakeholders to formulate an Indonesian style of PSB from 2002 until today. The qualitative method was used to review previous studies relating to PSB policies and governance throughout the world and official policies relating to the broadcast system in Indonesia. In-depth interviews were conducted with a former legislator who formulated Broadcast Law no. 32/2002, RRI and TVRI Supervisory Boards members, and media activists. The selected offices of the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia (RRI) and the Television of the Republic of Indonesia (TVRI) were also observed as the national PSB providers in Indonesia. This study found different pathways in PSB models (policy and governance) between developed democracies, such as the UK and Germany, and post-authoritarian countries, such as Indonesia. From a regulatory perspective, Indonesia’s PSB model is a mixture of the ideal form rooted in matured democracies with the old management of RRI/TVRI as ex-government channels. The hybrid PSB model has impeded RRI and TVRI’s transition to becoming actual public service broadcasters.

Keywords: BBC; Hybrid governance; Public service broadcasting; RRI; TVRI

Model lembaga penyiaran publik dalam transisi demokrasi Indonesia

ABSTRAK


Kata-Kata Kunci: BBC; media hibrida; lembaga penyiaran publik; RRI; TVRI

Correspondence: Dr.rer.soc. Masduki. Universitas Islam Indonesia. Jl. Kaliurang Km. 14,5 Ngemplak, Sleman, Yogyakarta, 55581. E-mail: masduki@uii.ac.id.

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INTRODUCTION

The fall of communist political regimes in Eastern Europe (1980) and authoritarian political systems in Asia (1990) brought changes to the media system, including the shift from state-owned to public-owned broadcasters (PSB) (Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008). In the last two decades, post-communist and authoritarian countries or so-called plural transitional political regimes have adopted a public service broadcasting system as a substitute for the pro-government broadcast system (Georgia, Macedonia, Thailand, and Indonesia), which was preceded by regulatory reform (Smith, 2002). This change is also driven by the power of pro-democratic actors amid the tendency for new political regimes to adopt policies of media liberalization in the broadcasting landscape (Masduki, 2020).

However, due to local political dynamics such as the continued autocratic politics, paternalism culture (Romano, 2003), clientelism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), and the oligarchic climate (Winters, 2014), the adoption of the public service broadcasting models may vary. Historically, the PSB system has been a complex study linked to political parallelism and direct state intervention (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). The idea and governance of PSB were initially used to describe the broadcasting system rooted in Western Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. The first PSB model appeared in the United Kingdom in 1923, namely the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) since 1922 (Booth, 2020), which was then adopted by various countries through regulatory changes as its entry point.

The widespread application of BBC’s model in new democracies such as Indonesia has not been working well. The unclear direction of democratization in each new democracy has led to varying types of PSB systems. Studies on the establishment of new PSBs in post-authoritarian transitional countries in Africa confirm the situation (Putzel & Zwan, 2005). Reports entitled: ‘Seeking Shortcuts, Assistance in PSB Development in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania’ (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2013) and ‘Public Service Media in Transitional Countries, An Enlightenment?’ (Harding, 2015) highlighted the failure of implementing the non-governmental broadcaster system in the African continent that had received technical assistance. Unfortunately, there is no similar academic study in Indonesia.

The overall broadcast system in European democracies is considered to be a mixture of public and private systems, and during the 1920s to 1970s period, PSB took the dominant position (Raboy, 1997; Williams, 2005) over private. Since the advent of radio technology in the 1920s, most countries in Western Europe have rejected state-regulated broadcast models such as the Soviet Union and rejected open competition models such as the US (Williams, 2005). They adopt a different broadcasting policy model, a combination of commercial and media corporations based on public aspirations. Broadcast content is produced and distributed by public institutions in a mechanism guaranteed by the state.

Historically, the dominant media policy in Western Europe until the 1980s was a monopolistic broadcasting system characterized by public solid service goals, absence of competition, and a relative degree of autonomy from rulers, yet media governance varied from country to country (Raboy, 1997). Entering the 1990s, public broadcasters in Europe began to encounter strong competitors with the emergence of commercial broadcasting models in many countries throughout the region. The exclusive position of the PSB in the UK, which has been achieved by the BBC, for example, since the 1970s, has been mixed with a market mechanism-based broadcast model such as in the United States.

Furthermore, the PSBs in Western Europe have several characteristics (McQuail, 1996): First, a programming policy catering to all tastes (providing access to minority groups with fair and impartial political coverage). Second, public accountability (through supervisory bodies). Third, the monopoly position in the national media system. Fourth, independent from political and non-commercial interests. The most common source of finance is the license fee, which is set by the ruling government or parliament. The PSB operational model in Europe is distinctive because it combines three main elements: public ownership (often not for profit), a monopoly on services and programming policies, a strong orientation of broadcasters to voice nationalism, and precisely valued local wisdom.
Williams identified three distinctive forms of public broadcasting rooted in Europe (Williams, 2005). First, an autonomous broadcast system, the separation of PSB decision-making from the ruling government as in the UK, Ireland, and Sweden. Second, a representation from all major political parties as well as strategic social groups in the PSB structure, such as in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark. Third, PSBs in countries with a transitioning political system to democracy, where the government and other political organs still intervene in the daily operations of PSBs, such as in Greece. In countries where PSBs can maintain their autonomy or is able to ensure a degree of public representation in their top structure, they will easily maintain a reputation for the best service to the public.

Strong economic conditions and high public awareness greatly determine the diverse sources of funding for PSB operations in Europe (Masduki, 2018). The relationship between PSB managers and state officials and their commitment to the public service mission are other key indicators. Until this study was conducted in 2020, several PSB channels were financed predominantly by public contributions, such as the BBC in the UK and NRK in Norway. However, other PSBs were financed by a mix of state subsidies and advertising revenues. For example, ABC and the Australian PSBs.

BBC has been the classic model of PSB since 1922. Its existence is governed by the Royal Charter and Employment Agreement with the Ministry, which guarantees the station’s editorial independence. Of structure, BBC established a Trust body, a kind of Broadcasting Council appointed by the Queen of England on the advice of the Prime Minister. The funding comes mainly from contributions, as for example, in 2005-2006, the BBC managed almost 77% of the public fund paid by houses television sets and 16% of revenue from commercial service activities. The remaining 7% came from grant assistance provided by the Office of Foreign Affairs, mainly for BBC World Service (BBC, 2020).

Compared to the European model, the PSB model in the United States is divided into two institutional forms: public and community broadcasters. Community broadcasting was the forerunner of the US public service media and consisted of information and education channels on the cable television system. The public broadcast system only emerged in the 1950s, and the public report funded by the Carnegie Foundation in 1966 led to the 1967 Public Broadcasting Act. This law guarantees the allocation of an annual grant for public television and radio in the United States. This law also establishes an independent state agency called the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), which is tasked with distributing grant funds and ensuring the implementation of the PSB decentralization model. The PSB model in the US is centered on stations based on member states’ channels (Masduki, 2018).

In contrast to Britain’s ‘paternalistic media system’ model to support BBC, PSBs in the United States are politically seen as ‘additional services’ to the existing model of non-state or private broadcasters. From World War II until the 1970s, PSBs in Europe were more substantial compared to the private sector; meanwhile, in the US, PSBs are weak and are represented by community-based television and radio networks, namely the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and National Public Radio (NPR). While the BBC has a mandate to serve the entire UK population, NPR and PBS serve audiences outside of commercial networks.

Over the last 25 years, communication scholars have paid attention to the strong linkages between politics and the broadcasting system within a particular geographical scale and political period, for example, the adoption of PSBs in the midst of the political crisis in the Middle East and post-communist Eastern Europe in the 1980s (Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008; Smith, 2002). With a more limited portion of the study in Asia and North Africa, there have been studies on PSB adoption, and its implementation failure after the autocracies collapsed in the 1990s (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2013; Raboy, 1997).

In Indonesia, studies on PSB policy and governance are still rare. Intani (2013), for example, focuses on examining issues that the Television of the Republic of Indonesia (Televisi Republik Indonesia – TVRI) faced by referring to the text of Law 32/2002, and it is not a comparative study of models. Doly (2013), Windrawan (2014), Astuti & Zulfrebriges (2016), and Nurhaipah & Fahruin (2019) highlight the macro problems of broadcasting regulation and overall PSB governance. As for

Upon closer observation, studies identifying the public interest broadcasting model in the Southeast Asian region, including Indonesia, are found to be sporadic. Past studies also did not use the perspective of media policy and the dynamic interaction between the idea of democracy and the actual situation of the media system in a country undergoing a democratic transition. This article attempts to fill in the gaps found in those studies. The article examines various institutional models of PSBs and discusses the PSB model that Indonesia as a post-authoritarian country, experienced. The article also discusses the opportunities for the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia (Radio Republik Indonesia – RRI) and TVRI to hold the mandate of national public broadcasters in Indonesia. As stipulated by Law no. 32/2002 on Broadcasting, both national media, i.e., RRI and TVRI, have changed from state-owned to public-owned media.

**RESEARCH METHOD**

The current article is intended to answer the following questions: what are growing PSB models (policy and governance) in developed countries and to what extent has Indonesia adopted the model? This article attempts to map PSB policy and institutional models in developed countries, especially in the UK and Germany. The two countries were chosen because there are some similarities in the political setting (post-war in Germany) and the context of media policy (liberalistic in England). Given the two models as a starting point, we will subsequently examine the extent of similarities and differences between the Indonesian PSB model (policy and governance) and the PSBs in developed countries. The qualitative method was applied to answer these questions. The media policy perspective was used as an approach to observe the policy aspect and the choice of the media governance model. Data were collected by conducting the three steps as follows: First, various past academic studies relating to the public broadcast system were collected. Among them include studies published by UNESCO, Deutsche Welle Media Akademie, etc. The academic literature was examined at the following two levels: conceptions of a public broadcasting system rooted in Western European countries and its comparison with new democracies. It was then followed by an analysis of media regulations relating to RRI and TVRI, especially Law 32/2002.

The second step was conducting in-depth interviews with three relevant parties to explore the mindset behind the idea of adopting PSB for Indonesia. They consisted of: First, the formulator of Law 32/2002 (articles 14 and 15), a former member of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) and Chair of the Special Committee for the Broadcasting Bill, Paulus Widiyanto; Second, representatives of Supervisory Board of RRI and TVRI; third, PSB advocates, including among others, a broadcasting historian, Darmanto. The third step was visiting several RRI and TVRI offices, particularly in Jakarta to witness firsthand the state of their institutional structure.

The empirical data were analyzed by referring to the interactive qualitative data analysis model (Miles, et al., 2014). All collected data were classified based on two things: conceptual and historical aspects of the emergence of PSBs in the developed world and in Indonesia and their public broadcasting policy/regulation. Subsequently, the author managed data reduction, data display, interpretation, and drew a conclusion. All of the research activities were carried out throughout 2020 by adhering to a strict COVID-19 protocol.

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

The description of the results and discussion in this section is divided into three aspects. First, an analysis of the policy and governance of PSBs that have developed in a democratic political climate in Western European countries, especially the UK and Germany. Second, a trend of the PSB model in non-European countries, especially those experiencing a post-authoritarian political period. Third, an analysis of regulations and thoughts relating to the policy model and institutions of public service broadcasters in Indonesia.
Table 1 Comparison of Two European PSBs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>The UK</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Media and political systems</td>
<td>- Liberal democracy</td>
<td>- Social Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Private broadcasting priority</td>
<td>- Public-private broadcasting equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Broadcast approach</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PSBs provider</td>
<td>BBC as the London based channels</td>
<td>ARD &amp; ZDF (network of regional/member states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Policy framework</td>
<td>Royal Charter and BBC Charter (contract based), subject to revision every ten years</td>
<td>- German constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Interstate treaty of broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ownership status</td>
<td>National public corporation</td>
<td>Regional/member state public corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Governing Board (top structure)</td>
<td>Two levels: supervisory and executive boards</td>
<td>Three levels: supervisory, administrative, and General Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Membership in the top structure</td>
<td>A mix of media professionals with figures that represent four regions within the UK.</td>
<td>All come from social and political agencies at both national and regional levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Funding source</td>
<td>A mix of license fees and commercial advertising</td>
<td>Mostly license fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>Professional autonomous employment</td>
<td>Similar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Platform of services</td>
<td>-BBC Internal UK channels are funded by the license fee and World Service is funded by commercial ads</td>
<td>-ARD and ZDF, Deutschland Radio for internal German services. -Deutsche Welle (for international service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Supporting entities</td>
<td>-BBC Media Action -Units for audit and public complaint, etc.</td>
<td>-Broadcasting and film schools -Units for audit, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Public access</td>
<td>-Member of BBC Trust, Audience Council. Ofcom has mandatory power to supervise BBC content, etc.</td>
<td>-Member of supervisory boards -Regional media regulators can supervise PSBs management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BBC, 2020; Die mediaenanstalten, 2010; Herzog & Karppinen, 2014

According to observations and analyses of relevant documents throughout 2020, the following two main models of PSBs were found in Europe.

Table 1 shows differences in media policy and PSB governance of two major European countries that PSBs all over the world have widely referred to. The two countries: the UK and Germany represent the PSB model under a liberal democratic and social-democratic political system. Another model that is widely referred to is PSB in the US. The distinctions
between PSBs in the UK and/or Germany and in the US (Rabêlo, et al., 2017) are as follows:

First, from a regulatory perspective, PSBs in the UK have two different levels of policy and institutions: the Royal Charter and the BBC Charter, while PSBs in the US are governed by a single policy, namely the Public Service Broadcasting Act. Germany’s PSBs providers: ARD and ZDF are governed by two regulatory levels: Broadcasting and Multimedia Law and the Interstates Treaty, which is a translation of the law.

Second, the UK model represented by the BBC adheres to centralized management while the US PSB is a network of non-profit, local radio and television, namely NPR and PBS. In line with the federal-state system, the institutional structure of Germany’s PSB is operated by the individual member states or follows a federalist state system.

Third, although the UK and US adhere to liberal media policies, PSB systems in the two countries differ in their service level: BBC is required to serve British citizens nationally, while NPR and PBS focus on serving specific communities.

Fourth, in terms of the mission, the national interest to defend the country’s ideology and people’s creativity has been clearly outlined by the respective political authorities for BBC in the UK. As for the United States public broadcasters, indicators of public interest in their media mission are determined autonomously by the local community.

Fifth, in terms of structure, members of the Broadcasting Council, as the manager of ARD and ZDF in Germany, are representatives of various social and political bodies. They are officially representing community-based public associations with varying numbers observed in the respective member states. They are not placed in the office of the Broadcasting Council based on selection by the parliament through a competitive process. The membership composition comprises professional and provincial representatives, such as in the UK and or in the United States.

Based on the description above, it can be said that the PSBs in the UK, Germany, and the US has a number of similarities, particularly in their regulatory framework as the primary media, ownership, structure, sources of funds, and human resources. The differences lie in the public access to Broadcasting Council and its services platform, which adapts to local social conditions. From here, two questions arise: what is the PSB policy and governance like in post-authoritarian countries transitioning toward democracy? To what extent have the models in Europe and the United States influenced or inspired PSB policies and governance in Indonesia?

Based on the experiences observed in several post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and post-authoritarians in Asia, the historic PSB model rooted in Western Europe and the US above is not quickly adopted by new regimes in post-authoritarian countries. The legacy of the past authoritarian rule resulted in a complex relationship between the media and the new government. Political parties wielding power in the regulatory process ultimately determined the PSB format. In this regard, globalizing the PSB model in Western Europe and applying it to developing countries is a risky undertaking (McCargo, 2012).

In addition, the emergence of ‘mixed political regimes’ (Voltmer, 2013) in post-autocratic governmental power may result in a new model of public broadcasting. Voltmer described the presence of ‘hybrid regimes’ in Eastern Europe and East Asia, where the authorities are a mix between the old autocracy and the new regime that partially adopts democratic principles. Such a regime adheres to a gray area between autocracy and democracy. No longer an autocracy, but not entirely a democracy. These new countries have a fair electoral system, but they fail to reinforce their democratic elements that go beyond formal political structures. Local wisdom for accepting democracy exists, but legal institutionalization remains weak.

Raboy points out that different political contexts, as well as historical and social conditions, determine PSB journeys in transitional countries (Raboy, 1997). Within this framework, Raboy emphasizes three forms of the broadcasting system: (a) between private and state orientations, (b) between the state and society through its socio-cultural mission; and (c) between state broadcasting and national politics. The organizational structure of the PSB policy framework may be generically borrowed by post-authoritarian rulers from Western countries, but due to unprepared public
engagement, it can be adapted slowly. Taking the establishment of the PSB system in Cambodia as an example, Im (2011) concluded that the establishment of public-oriented broadcasting in the country was determined mainly by a mixture of political, economic, civil society groups, and socio-cultural compatibility.

Voltmer further noted that when authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed, there was still a bureaucratic culture in the administration of state broadcasters, the excessive employees, inefficient working culture, and the state media were governed by an attitude of loyalty to the dominant political power, instead of the public (Voltmer, 2013). Several options emerged to solve this problem, including the privatization of the state broadcasters. However, civil society and international media policy consultants intensively promoted the need to convert state broadcasters to PSBs as part of the democratic agenda.

The new political system in post-authoritarian countries is polarized, and this condition is often nonsynonymous with democratic political systems. Interest groups such as the military, monarchy, and diaspora communities play roles that are dissimilar to political parties embedded in developed democracies. New political administrations tend to be unstable or weak in carrying out democracy (Voltmer, 2013). In this situation, the migration of broadcast media from being an instrument of government authority to being an autonomous institution for the public domain has to deal with inadequate regulatory challenges, which lead to delaying or redesigning its ideal elements (mission, ownership, structure, and funding).

In terms of ownership, Raboy classifies broadcasting governance into six models: (i) national public service broadcasting; (ii) alternative public broadcasting; (iii) commercial broadcasting; (iv) mixed ownership (public or community, private-partnership, and joint venture); (v) community broadcasting; and (vi) state broadcasting (Raboy, 1997). Although policymakers in new democracies decided to formally change the state broadcasting into public channels in the process of adopting the Western European PSB models, state control remains unchanged. Referring to Raboy and Hallin & Mancini’s conception of PSB models (government, national PSBs, professional, parliamentary, and civic corporatism model) (2004), new PSBs in new democracies, including Indonesia can be seen as government/parliamentary controlled PSB, instead of civic corporatism or professional PSBs.

Raboy’s study of PSBs in transitional countries (1997) identified three levels of PSBs. First, the residual state, which refers to countries that are still static, still dominant in a single and monolithic state-owned broadcasting system. Second, emergent, a situation where private and community broadcasters play a significant role in addition to state-owned broadcasters, especially in Asia or Africa. According to Raboy, the governments in these two regions are still looking for a suitable new broadcast model, a combination of the public, private, and community, while still viewing broadcasting as a means for mobilizing development. Third, the transitional media system in the former Soviet Union bloc countries which are heading toward a pluralistic model but is established on an authoritarian monopolistic foundation.

Zaid, in his study on PSBs development in South Asia, suggests that the institutional architecture of public broadcasters in these countries is complex, including in Afghanistan and Bangladesh (Zaid 2016). What the local countries have in common are the solid political, economic, and historical influences alongside global pressures associated with capitalism. In the Middle East and North Africa, despite enjoying supportive regulations, PSBs’ existence has become a “quasi-system” in the arena of conflict played by autocratic Arab political regimes. Authoritarian political culture makes it difficult for state-owned broadcasters to turn into PSB (Zaid, 2016). In Morocco, the mission to establish a PSB is still in its embryonic stage, and similar circumstances apply to Jordan and Lebanon.

Using the four main elements of governance: mission, ownership, structure, and funding, there are at least three trends of PSBs in emerging democracies, including Thailand and South Africa. South Africa applies a parliamentary model by placing South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) under parliamentary control, while Thailand, through the Thai Public Broadcasting System (TPBS), applies an autonomous agency model outside its government. SABC’s mission is aimed at having more substantial cultural broadcasting and
maintaining national integration as stipulated by the country’s broadcast regulation, namely the 2009 Broadcasting Law. Meanwhile, TPBS’s mission is more likely aimed at fulfilling the public’s right to information. TPBS is given a special umbrella law called: Thailand’s Public Broadcasting Law, enacted in 2008. In terms of its institutional structure, SABC adopts a two-chamber model: the Board of Governors and the Executive Council elected by the parliament. Meanwhile, TPBS has two bodies: the Board of Governors and the Executive Board, legalized by the Thai Prime Minister. SABC is a state-owned enterprise, while TPBS is an autonomous public broadcasting agency. SABC funding is a mixture of fees and advertising, while TPBS relies on special product taxes.

The two PSBs above illustrate similarities and differences that reflect the political and economic conditions of the respective countries. For example, there is a contrasting mission of facilitating freedom of information and national order/harmony. In relation to ownership, the choice of state enterprise in South Africa reflects the commercialization of the country’s public media system. In contrast, Thailand’s TPBS adopts the model of an autonomous institution and distances itself from direct intervention by Parliament. In addition, TPBS receives an uncommon source of funding, i.e., tobacco taxes, while South African PSB accepts money from license fees and advertising as the primary sources of its broadcast funding.

Regarding media transformation from state to public, Smith found a unique process of broadcasting model transformation in post-authoritarian countries (Smith, 2002). In Thailand, the establishment of PSB took place under military rule, and it emerged on account of intense pressure from civil societies. In 2008, Thailand’s PSB Law was issued guaranteeing editorial independence. The PSB is financed by taxes on tobacco and alcohol. Smith found that Thailand PSB has a Board of Governors with a term of 4 years and an organized audience council of 50 people (Smith, 2002). By contrast, in India, the newly established PSB was a combination of two government broadcast giants: Doordarshan and All India Radio, which changed their status from state to PSBs in 1997 through the Prasar Bharati Act. The main challenge in developing public broadcasters in both countries was in changing the mindset of their programmers from serving elite political authorities or those who pay them as public servants to serve the public interest.

Given those illustrations in mind, it can be said that the ideas of creation and institutionalization of PSBs in most transitional government regimes varied. There was a trend to become a hybrid of the classic PSB model as demonstrated by BBC with the old autocratic channels. The idea of a hybrid media system was initially promoted by (Chadwick, 2013), who based his study on the technological dynamics, structure, and behavior of commercial media in the US and the UK that adhere to liberalism. ‘Hybrid’ is a broad political concept referring to a mixed model of democracy and authoritarianism in a transitional society.

Diamond describes it as ‘quasi-democracy’ or ‘competitive authoritarianism.’ Formal democratic rules were applied, including freedom of expression and media, but political intervention by the government over society and media remains (Diamond, 2002). The concept of hybridity is commonly used in the social sciences. For example, hybridity in political science is considered a combination of elite control and individual autonomy, bureaucratization, etc. In this sense, in Asian democratic transition countries, being a republic does not mean adopting a liberal democratic system. On the other hand, being a republic does not always mean that solid-state domination exists. With this notion, the hybridity of the media/PSB system is mixed governance of a non-profit orientation, alternative media, and media with commercial purposes, or between government/state media and community or public broadcasting models (Chadwick, 2013).

In the media system of the UK and the US, Chadwick identified a hybrid tendency in the mixture of new and conventional media. Older media such as television, radio, and newspapers are still referred to as mainstream, but the nature of the media itself is changing, adapting, evolving, and renewing its delivery channels (Chadwick, 2013). He sees the hybridity of the media system as a result of interactions between political power and inter-media competition during dynamic transitions festooned by contingencies and negotiations.

In line with Chadwick regarding hybridity, Voltmer assesses the presence of hybrid forms of political communication that
accommodate liberalism, a free press with past politics, authoritarian values, and transitional experiences (Volterm, 2013). The unclear social structures, local wisdom, and history of having an autocratic political culture formed a distinctive media structure (Huang et al., 2010), including the broadcasting model for the public interest.

Assessing broadcasters in Western and non-Western countries, Volterm concluded that the public broadcasting models developed in Western democracies had been modified and sometimes rejected by new democracies (Volterm, 2013). The two dominant broadcast governance models: the commercials of America and the monopoly model for public services in Europe have different journeys outside the two regions. In Latin American countries, the broadcasting model was introduced in the 1920s and was commercial in nature. State media ownership in this region is insignificant, although each country has its own national channels. The dominance of a similar commercial system is also found in the former US colonies in the Asia Pacific. In contrast, the former British colonies in Africa and Asia embraced BBC’s model of public media autonomy, developing a state-owned national broadcasting system. However, the new democracies place their BBC-like national broadcasters as a reinforcement of national identity and most of the managers are still civil servants.

Conclusively, the lack of experience in managing PSBs and the lack of public attention to the transition of their state-owned broadcasters to PSBs, the public media design and its practice in new democracies may differ from the original models of Western European countries. It can be a newly autonomous PSB or it may go back to becoming an authoritarian broadcaster. According to the concept proposed by Chadwick (2013); Raboy (1997); Volterm (2013), PSBs in these areas form a ‘hybrid’ of old government-run operations and new public interest media. The mass devastation of the old autocratic regime and the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe and or Asia, including Indonesia, marked by the enactment of new constitutions, was not directly followed up by the establishment of pro-public media policies and governance.

The remaining question is: what is the PSB model in Indonesia like? Based on the document analysis, primarily Law no. 32/2002 and other related regulations, enriched by field observations throughout the 2002-present period, it was found that the PSB system, mandated to RRI and TVRI, was the end result of a lengthy debate in the process of formulating Law 32/2002, which also reflects a generic adaptation on the one hand and resistance to democratization on the other. Throughout the period 1998 to 2002, there were debates among government officials, parliamentary members, media professionals, and media activists regarding the PSB model as follows in table 2.

The debate culminated on November 28, 2002, when Law 32/2002 was passed. More detailed regulations were later specified in Government Regulations no. 12 and 13 of 2005 concerning RRI and TVRI as the official PSB providers. Upon closer observation of Law 32/2002, the provisions on PSB are significantly weak, regulated only by five articles. First is article 13, which states that Indonesian PSB is one of four broadcasting types, alongside private, community, and subscription broadcasters. Second, article 14 regulates the legal status, mandate, and top organizational structure of PSB as a state-owned, independent, and broadcast-oriented legal entity to serve the entire public interest. Third, article 15 explains the sources of funding (license fees, state budget, social donations, advertising, and other income relevant to broadcasting) and aspects of financial accountability (financial reports must be audited by a public accountant and published in the media). Fourth, two articles that regulate the limitation of broadcast content aired by RRI/TVRI, as well as local PSBs, are required to provide at least 60% of domestic programs per day; to provide airtime for commercial advertising (by a maximum of 15%) and social advertising (a minimum of 30%) of the total duration per-day.

Based on the five articles of the Law and in-depth interviews with the research informants, three conditions of PSB policies and governance in Indonesia were identified. First, there was an ideal choice of PSB as an independent entity with a public ownership model (represented by parliament), a change in the legal status of RRI and TVRI from being state-run to public-run media. Second, the introduction of the license fee as a funding source coupled with the state
budget as the definitive source of funding. The license fee represents public participation and is considered a legendary symbol of public funding the world over. Third, the establishment of a supervisory board that is directly elected by parliament as a symbol of public access to their PSB management. This supervisory board (Dewan Pengawas) has never existed in the old structure of Indonesia’s national broadcasting institution during the Suharto era.

CONCLUSION

By observing Indonesian and various global media policies relating to PSBs, which include, among others, Law 32/2002, Government Regulations No. 12 and 13 of 2005, which were applicable from 2002 to 2020, and coupled by conducting semi-structured interviews and field visits to a number of PSB offices in Indonesia and Germany, we arrive at the following conclusions below:

First, there are various forms of PSB governance, with Western European and the US PSBs as the leading models. Compared to PSBs in Germany, the UK, and the US, Indonesia’s PSB model slightly differs from the media system found in developed democracies, especially Germany and the UK. Given the fact that BBC was initially established as a public corporation with professional public services, RRI and TVRI stand in contrast to that, in the sense that they were government-owned broadcasters with all the complexities of being bureaucratic institutions for 30 years. The transformation path that RRI/TVRI experienced from government-run to public media reflects a compromise between the desire to create a professional public media institution and the interest in maintaining state control and government assets in the broadcasting offices.

Second, in terms of media orientation, Indonesian PSBs adopt a distinctive mission

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Table 2 Proposals of Indonesian PSBs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Legal status</td>
<td>A unit under the Ministry of Information was established and controlled by the government.</td>
<td>A public corporation supervised by the Ministry of State Enterprises</td>
<td>Independent and non-profit public body to represent the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Supervisory and Executive boards elected by the Ministry of Information.</td>
<td>Commissaries and CEOs, as in the private companies</td>
<td>Supervisory and Executive boards are elected by Parliament as in the European.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Service area</td>
<td>Throughout the Indonesian archipelago, with shared frequencies of public, private, and community broadcasters</td>
<td>The particular limited area outside the commercial broadcasting coverages.</td>
<td>Throughout the Indonesian archipelago with more significant frequencies allocated compared to commercial channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>The state budget, advertising, license fee, public donation, etc.</td>
<td>The state budget, license fee, and limited commercial advertising</td>
<td>The state budget, advertising, license fee, public donation, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

compared to PSBs in Europe. The primary mandate of Indonesian PSBs is to voice national integration and not as an agent of freedom of expression, as is the case in the EU. In its development since 2002, the services are prioritized showing traditional cultures and mitigating natural disasters, which distinguish Indonesian PSBs from similar media in other countries.

Third, the legal status and management of Indonesian PSBs are not identical to the UK or Germany’s PSBs and even to those in other Asian countries such as Japan. This reflects the different specific cultural history and political situations, which trigger the emergence of different models. There is a mix (hybrid) between the model of government broadcasters with public-owned institutions as a reflection of transition politics and media adaptation to local political interest. In reality, RRI and TVRI are still state agencies with the following attributes: civil servants as the central employees, domination of the annual state budget as a source of funds, and bureaucratic working culture as a consequence of being a governmental institution.

Fourth, this study found some similarities between PSBs in Indonesia and the UK, especially in its top structure with the dual chamber (supervisory board and board of directors) model, an open selection process and the adoption of a license fee. However, during the last twenty years, both supervisory and executive boards of RRI/TVRI experienced high political intervention and clientelism, compared to similar agencies in the UK/Germany. With no experience in managing competitive funding, the idea of collecting license fees only remained on paper and the two broadcasters continued to enjoy their dependence on the state budget with the risk of government intervention.

Since December 28, 2002, Indonesia legally introduced BBC-like PSB, and TVRI and RRI are obligated to be independent PSBs. Law 32/2002 on Broadcasting regulates PSBs, which includes, among others, article 14 stipulating that RRI/TVRI serve as an independent, neutral, non-profitable media, and they operate and function for the benefit of the nation. Also, another article in the law states that the PSBs are governed by two independent public bodies: the supervisory board and the board of directors. These two structures are similar to the British BBC model. Two other articles facilitate varied sources of funding, coming from contributions, the annual state budget (APBN), community contributions, advertisements, and cooperation in commercial activities.

However, since the inception of their mandated status as PSBs from 2002 to 2020, there has been no significant change observed in RRI and TVRI toward becoming professional public broadcasters. Not unlike the former communist countries in Eastern Europe or post-crisis countries in Africa, the change is only in its formal status, but in reality, they remain a bureaucratic institution. Some problems have emerged, which include, among others, continued state control and a strong interest in commercialization (Intani, 2013; Nugroho et al., 2012). As an example, from 2000 to 2011, political intervention occurred in the election of the TVRI supervisory board. The conflict reached its peak in early 2014 when Commission I of the House of Representatives (DPR) postponed the disbursement of the 2015 state budget allocation for TVRI. The recent issuance of Law no. 11 of 2020 on Job Creation (Omnibus Law) strengthens the desire for media liberalization, thereby marginalizing PSBs.

In summary, there is a mixture of the old autocratic broadcast model as a government agency and the new aspiration of the PSB model in Indonesia. Public efforts aimed at having a solid public broadcasting institution as well as the integration of RRI and TVRI have continued to emerge since 2012. From a regulatory aspect, the revision of Broadcasting Law no. 32/2002 serves as a critical point of entry. In addition, the idea of preparing a specific law called Radio and Television Law of the Republic of Indonesia (RTRI), which has been apparent since 2012, is a new means of addressing the issue at hand. Further studies are needed to map out the perceptions of employees working at RRI/TVRI in response to the above policy reform, as well as how the public perceives both media.

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