

BETWEEN CLIENTELISM AND PATRIMONIALISM: LOCAL POLITICS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT. Erik Kuhonta, a Southeast Asian expert, describe in his article on institution of the states in Southeast Asia that among the spectrum of clientelism and regal-rational bureaucracy, only Singapore and Malaysia could be considered as having an administrative system of rule and law based – of administrative state – the closest to being labeled as legal-rational bureaucracy. Among others he observed, the Philippines is categorized as a patrimonial system, whilst Thailand and Indonesia are recognized as in the middle, with some patrimonial practices still occurring but functioning bureaucracy legal system. This study tries to find the answer to these questions: How do the clientelism and patrimonialism practices in democratized Indonesia and the Philippines local politics? The study concludes that both in Indonesia and the Philippines patronage politics is very much marring the democratization process, economic development, welfare parity, and bureaucratic reform through practices of various kinds of clientelistic approach. Democratization is not a strategy for the elimination of clientelism and patrimonialism, moreover we see meritocratic and Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy still existing in countries with clientelism and patronage politics, such as Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, or in countries that do not need full-fledge democracy, such as Singapore and Malaysia. We could even see clientelism being regulated in more developed democracy. This study shows that in countries that has clientelism practices yet do not have the effect of corruption and could manage poverty reduction program has society of better economic welfare and higher education background.

Keywords: Democratization; Local Politics; Indonesia; Philippines

ABSTRAK. Erik Kuhonta, peneliti Asia Tenggara menjelaskan dalam artikelnya tentang institusi negara di Asia Tenggara bahwa di antara spektrum birokrasi klientelisme dan birokrasi regal-rasional, hanya Singapura dan Malaysia yang dapat dianggap paling dekat dicap sebagai birokrasi legal-rasional sebab memiliki sistem negara administrasi berdasarkan aturan dan hukum. Di antara banyak yang telah diamati, Filipina dikategorikan sebagai sistem patrimonial, sementara Thailand dan Indonesia diakui berada di tengah, dengan beberapa praktik patrimonial masih terjadi meski memiliki sistem hukum birokrasi yang berfungsi. Studi ini mencoba mencari jawaban atas pertanyaan-pertanyaan berikut: Bagaimana praktik klientelisme dan patrimonialisme dalam demokrasi politik lokal Indonesia dan Filipina? Kajian ini menyimpulkan bahwa politik patronase baik di Indonesia maupun di Filipina sangat mencemari proses demokratisasi, pembangunan ekonomi, paritas kesejahteraan, dan reformasi birokrasi melalui praktik berbagai macam pendekatan klientelistik. Demokratisasi bukanlah strategi untuk menghilangkan klientelisme dan patrimonialisme, terlebih kita dapat melihat birokrasi legal-rasional meritokratis dan weberian masih ada di negara-negara dengan politik klientelisme dan patronase, seperti Taiwan, Jepang, dan Korea Selatan, atau di negara-negara yang tidak membutuhkan demokrasi penuh, seperti Singapura dan Malaysia. Studi ini menunjukkan bahwa di negara-negara maju yang masih memiliki praktik klientelisme namun memiliki sistem pengelola program pengentasan kemiskinan yang baik dan tidak memiliki efek korupsi dan mereka memiliki masyarakat dengan kesejahteraan ekonomi yang lebih baik dan latar belakang pendidikan yang lebih tinggi.

Kata Kunci: Demokratisasi; Politik Lokal; Indonesia; Filipina

INTRODUCTION

Erik Kuhonta, a Southeast Asian expert, described in his article on institution of the states in Southeast Asia that among the spectrum of clientelism and regal-rational bureaucracy, only Singapore and Malaysia could be considered as having an administrative system of rule and law based – of administrative state – the closest to being labeled as legal-rational bureaucracy. Among others he observed, the Philippines is categorized as a patrimonial system, whilst Thailand and Indonesia are recognized as in the middle, with some patrimonial practices still occurring but functioning bureaucracy legal system. (Kuhonta et al., 2008)

Carl Lande described Philippine politics in the 1960s as being based on networks of patron-client links or other personal connections where

participants offered each other support and loyalty. a number of scholars such as John Gershman, and Robert Stauffer described post-dictatorship Philippines as returning to pre-Marcos era of “elite democracy” (Lande, 2000). The patron-client factional, patrimonial, and neocolonial frameworks, according to Kerkvliet’s 1995 declaration, are the three most important ones. (Querubin, 2016). Nowak and Synder (1974) discussed Philippines clientelistic politics derive from the mix of electoral institutions to that of feudal social structure.

Taken from studies above, it is an inquiring phenomon in Southeast Asia which this study would like to elaborate furthermore, that of the notion that two of the more restrictive form of democracy in Singapore and Malaysia are considered delivering better bureaucratic polity, whilst Indonesia, the

Philippine, and prior to military coup in Thailand that ranked better in democracy index would still be marred by inefficiency of clientelist, patrimonial and neo patrimonial form of governance.

With this research background, we have proposed this study to answer this question:

How do clientelism and patrimonialism practices in democratized Indonesia and the Philippines local politics?

This research aims at identifying clientelism and patrimonialism practices in local politics of Indonesia and the Philippines and understand how it is taken place in a democratized country such as Indonesia and the Philippines. This research also aims at enriching literature and promoting good practices in local politics.

This research would take a comparative approach between the two local politics of Indonesia and the Philippines. In order to do so, we would like to highlight the notion on the two countries local politics practices, and to show specifically on the pattern of clientelism politics and patrimonialism bureaucracy in those two countries.

This study uses a qualitative approach or method, emphasizing the aspect of comparative analysis. Comparative research is research that compares. This research was conducted to compare the similarities and differences related to objects and facts related to clientelism and patrimonialism in the Philippines and Indonesia, with certain theoretical foundations. A form of descriptive study called comparative research aims to discover and examine the factors that contribute to the occurrence or emergence of a certain phenomenon. A different definition of comparative research is a form of study that contrasts two nations, groups, or more than one variable (Nazir, 2009)

METHODS

Theoretical Framework

Clientelism, Patrimonialism, and Neo-Patrimonialism

Clientelism in both Indonesia and the Philippines can be traced back from the time of development in earlier centuries, where population still lives in villages and peasants is their main occupation. John Powell elaborate, characteristic of society living of peasants is resource scarcity, if they are to rely on agriculture production, the major factor of productive wealth is land, where they do not own or have little access to it. Peasants also has limited access to technology, capital, marketing information, and credit, all these combine leads to ineptness of peasants to improve earning and living condition, in other words, they are poor (Querubin, 2016).

Factoring furthermore into this is the fact that they also do not have much leverage in

dealing with condition of threats abounds in their environment, such as diseases, accident, natural disaster, or death. George Foster summed this by his illustration:

“peasants view their social, economic, and natural universes – their total environment – as one in which all of the desired things in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship, and love, manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and safety, exist in finite quantity and are always in short supply as far as the peasant is concerned. Not only do these and all other ‘good things’ exist in finite and limited quantities, but in addition there is no way directly within peasant power to increase the available quantities” (Powell, 1970).

By way of extending kinship and social relationship among people and groups, peasants are able to cope with these shortage of necessities, one such arrangement of social interaction is the clientele system or patron-client relationship. Here is an anthropologist describes the relationship of a land lord and sharecropper:

“a peasant might approach the landlord to ask a favor, perhaps a loan of money or help in some trouble with the law, or the landlord might offer his aid knowing of a problem. If the favor were granted or accepted, further favors were likely to be asked or offered at some later time. The peasant would reciprocate – at a time and in a context different from that of the acceptance of the favor, in order to de-emphasize the material self-interest of the reciprocative action – by bringing the land lord especially choice offerings from the farm produce, or by sending some member of the peasant family to perform services in the land lord’s home, by refraining from cheating the land lord, or merely by speaking well of him in public and professing devotion to him.” (Powell, 1970)

Although growing significantly since 1980s, society in both Indonesia and the Resources are still largely inaccessible to the Philippines, and despite the fact that both countries adhere to a democratic system, these systems are unable to predict how the country will develop because candidates rarely make pledges that can be trusted by large portions of the population. Governments so frequently adopt clientelist policies that involve high targeted spending, high rent-seeking and low supply of public goods (Keefer, 2007).

As Keefer mentioned, the strategies made by politician in these settings have two viable courses: buying voters with resources such as advertising, canvassing, or others to build up. The second is to

rely on patrons, whose clients trust them but not the candidates; with the second course, politicians do not need to invest into building up their credibility or reputation, they could simply rely on patrons to do those on their behalf (Keefer, 2007). Clientelism emphasize that patron-client relationships are personalized, ongoing, and reciprocal:

“in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron” (Keefer, 2007)

Additionally, Roniger emphasizes that although the patron-client relationship is unequally beneficial to both parties, it is voluntary. The two are engaged in an exchange of unrelated commodities and services. This relationship is understood to develop over time and through a number of exchanges based on reciprocative norms, duties, and potential affectivity. (Fernandez-Collado & Roniger, 1991).

Kaufman meanwhile put forth clientelism in the following characteristics:

- Relationship involve people with uneven power and status
- Build upon the ideas of reciprocity, which is an act of interpersonal exchange carried out as a means of self-control. By providing products and services until the promised reward does not occur, each actor is dependent on the other.
- The client-professional relationship is described as specific and confidential. Only under the context of societal standards or public legislation is it released (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002)

The relationship between unequal individuals and non-comparable goods can be inferred from the explanation given above because patrons are strong enough to control resources over clients whose status occupies a low position. Due to the higher-value resources they hold, the client benefits more from the transaction and is in a stronger position to negotiate (Hilgers, 2008). This relationship also depended on what negotiating position the client can give to the patron and vice versa, thus in electoral democracy if what the client offer is render insufficient for the political candidate (patron) then the relationship would cease to exist, at least until the next electoral period.

Clientelistic institutions are typically considered as being at the other end of the institutional spectrum from democratic ones in their ideal forms. While democratic-making process relies on approaches such as transparency and public openness to the

decision making through officials responsible for accountability in the coming election, clientelism holds accountability through power transfer from the highest of authority through patrons, and only responsible by the assurance of those patrons in receiving their share of power during the tenure of politicians. Disadvantageous groups do not necessarily take into account of service received of such politicians' policies. Tabel below summarizes the differences between both in the analysis of Brikenhorrf and Goldsmith (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002).

Table 1. Characteristic of Clientelistic and Democratic

Clientelistic	Democratic
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authority is intimate, resides along individuals. • Core ideals are personal advancement and aggrandizement. • Leaders often monopolize power and avoid accountability for their actions. • The relationship between leaders and supporters in unclear and sometimes unstable. • Regarding the replacement of leaders, there are no standard protocols. • Leaders retain power by serving personal favors of which secures loyalty from followers. • No policy decisions are taken in open and there is no room for public discussions and participation. • Political parties are structured around specific individuals. • Vertical linkages are a feature of fractured civil society. • Procedures are challenging for external links to follow since decision-making norms are widely acknowledged. • Interests of supporters influence decisions. • There is a wide range of patronage appointments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authority is based on institutionalized positions. • Rule of law, fair elections, and majority rule make up the essential values. • The relationship between leaders and their followers is open and predictable. • Leaders share power with others and are responsible for their actions. • There are established rules regarding leaders replacement. • Leaders retain power by delivering group benefits that win the support of significant portions of society. • Policy decisions are made with open discussions and evaluation. • Political parties are structured around declared programs. • Civil society is extensive and is defined by horizontal relationships. • Decision-making processes are open and transparent, with clear standards. • Decisions are made in the public's interests. • There is little room for patronage appointments.

Source: Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002

From the table above, it can be concluded that although the characteristics of political clientelism may vary depending on the context and the specific practices involved, some common features are as further summarized:

It can be further inferred that political clientelism is based on personalized relationships between politicians and their clients. These relationships are often long-term and built on mutual trust and obligations. Moreover, political clientelism involves an exchange of favors, in which politicians offer resources such as jobs, contracts,

or other benefits to their clients in exchange for their political support, such as votes or loyalty.

Another distinguished feature is the hierarchical structure. Often times, political clientelism operates within a hierarchical structure, in which politicians at the top of the chain distribute resources to their clients, who may in turn distribute resources to their own clients, and so on.

In that sense, access to resources, such as jobs or government contracts, is limited and highly competitive. A quite apparent negative quality of clientelism often operates in a context of limited transparency, in which the distribution of resources and terms of exchange are not publicly disclosed. This can make it difficult to hold politicians accountable for their actions.

Reinforcement of inequality: political clientelism tends to reinforce existing inequalities, as politicians often direct resources to their own supporters, rather than to those who are most in need or most deserving. This can contribute to a cycle of poverty and political exclusion for those who are not part of the clientelist network.

Patrimonialism

Meanwhile, what patrimonialism does is to further incorporate the clientelistic behavior pattern into the political organization of bureaucracy. Weber (1947) coined the phrase patrimonialism to describe situations where the administrative bureaucracy is designated by and liable to the top leader. The majority of official working procedures are impromptu and off-the-record. Patrimonial administration and clientelistic politics go hand in hand since administrative positions are some of the best privileges a patron or boss can provide his subordinates. (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). In democratic nuances such behavior would be a common practice, where appointed officials are those who have supported the elected candidate during their campaign. These occurred in Indonesia, the Philippines and any other democratic countries all over the world. However, in local politics, elected officials are only those who are running for the office while the rest are part of the bureaucracy – who should not be involved in any political activities and focus on giving services to any parties regardless of their political choices.

On the other spectrum of this is what Weber perceived the legal-rational bureaucracy as an expanding political and administrative power. In such systems, political and administrative parts of administration are clearly separated, and politically unbiased officials create policy “without fear or favor.” (Pak Kimchoeun & Horng, 2007).

Table 2. Continuum of Administrative System

Patrimonial	Rational - legal Bureaucratic
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administrators are hired and promoted in exchange for close ties to political figures. • There is an implicit hierarchy, minimal output expertise, and a vague reporting process. • Administrators increase their pay with grafting and kickbacks. • Administrators operate inconsistently, rely on arbitrary logic, and adhere to ad hoc procedures. • Rules are partially applied and some persons obtain preferential treatment. • Sales and purchases made by the government often include verbal agreements. • Internal controls are not strict. • Documentation having inconsistent coloring with critical subjects left off the books. • Subjects don't hold much appeal for unsatisfactory service. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is an authorized hierarchy structure with clear division of labor, explicit requirements for output, and well-defined reporting routes. • Administrators are hired and promoted through competitive processes that are based on their merit and experience. • Administrators are not allowed to increase their pay. • Administrators follow standardized procedures and take predictable measures based on unbiased procedures. • Laws are impartially applied, and everyone is treated fairly. • Government purchases and sales are conducted under legally binding contracts. • Strict internal controls. • Accurate records are kept and frequently audited. • If subjects receive unsatisfactory service, they may appeal.

Source: Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002

The table above summarizes the difference between the political patrimony and the rational-legal bureaucracy. In a political system based on patrimony, it can be difficult for new and diverse voices to be heard, and for political power to be distributed more broadly throughout society. This can lead to a lack of accountability and transparency in government, as those in power prioritize their own interests and those of their personal networks over the broader needs of the population.

Patrimonial politics can also create a sense of entitlement among those in power, who may see their positions as rights rather than responsibilities. This can further entrench inequalities and perpetuate a system of oligarchy, where a small group of elites hold power over the majority of the population.

Weber acknowledges that rational bureaucrats should act and treat every citizens alike, with the belief that any procedures made are considered best to achieve the purpose of the whole people they govern. To be able to reach this rational-legal bureaucracy system should: a) set up a standard procedure of administration, b) standard recruitment procedures based on objectives measures c) definite roles of each divisions and personnel, d) accountability on each person responsibility on policy making. Administrators are required to be professionally disciplined, receive a normal pay, and accountable to the sense of public role, making them to have a certain career direction to ascend when they complete their designated roles and duties (Pak Kimchoeun & Horng, 2007).

Weber also identifies the pattern of structure of power in between these two styles of government. In patrimonialism, he sees that there would be a powerful figure who dominates the power structure of administration, this could be in the form of military strength, financial resources, social power in the sense of family or kinship, or other forms that will enable a certain group to enhance their authority, status, wealth, and/or control over the administration as a whole. Whereas the rational-legal system would have a graded hierarchy, written documentation, salaried, full-time professionals, and political neutrality as the backbone to support the administration of an office established with the intention of reducing the requirements of the people. For this matter, public servant should not engage with reciprocal behavior of expecting payment to their provide services, rather to expect certain amount of salary in spite of how much service they have provided.

Neo-Patrimonialism

The right to charge was assigned to a person rather than an office, as was the case with traditional patrimonialism. Modern neo-patrimonialism is characterized by connections of loyalty and reliance that penetrate formal political and administrative structures. Leaders use administrative positions less to serve the public good than to amass personal wealth and status. It is deliberate to confuse the line between private and public interests. The giving of personal favors by public authorities, both inside the state and in society, is the essence of neo-patrimonialism. Clients rally political support and refer all choices upwards as a sign of devotion to patrons in exchange for cash rewards.

Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith suggested what practices of clientelism, patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism would cause in the political society: rent-seeking activity people in power gained through and expanded by such behaviors would negotiate among their supporters and themselves on how to divide the pie rather than try to extend the pie to non-supporters. Corruption here would be to receive exceptional policy benefits through illegal means such as bribery. The resistance to a committed route of bureaucratic change is characterized by stop-and-go reform and a lack of implementation capacity. Ethnic politics are used because it serves as the easiest form of identity to differentiate people in the society, religion also serves well in this regard. Voters will be driven to choose candidate who has the same identity background, be it ethnicity or religion. Poverty reduction while direct elections will bring some benefits to the poor, these behaviors will favor those who have larger resource to negotiate and disadvantageous to those who are lacking bargaining

power, thus bringing poverty reduction to a meager act of cosmetic policies (Pak Kimchoeun & Horng, 2007).

What then would be the course to alleviate these problems? Again, Brinkerhoff et. al. offered four strategies to alleviate them: first is to liberalize the economic system practices of open and transparent economic system will end protectionist trade policies thus made economic actors unwilling to seek privileges from the government, while accordingly makes state less vulnerable to elite capture (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). Second is democratization with the purpose of having normal people a voice in public concerns will compel government to work for the greater number, not just people with connections. Thirdly is to have decentralization that will distribute power from central to local level and move government closer to the governed, in return it will empower local knowledge and bring policies to better tackle the needs of local citizens. Lastly is civil service reform to ensure government agencies of a certain written procedures on how it works, recruits, and specific roles and duties assign and expected of bureaucrats to perform, evaluate, and enhance their careers as professional public servant (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002).

This study uses a qualitative approach or method which is a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2008).

Data is collected from two main sources. The primary collection of data sources from books, academic journals, official research subject reports, and other relevant materials to clientelism and patrimonialism practices in the Philippines and Indonesia. Additionally, this research uses secondary data in which is obtained from book reviews, online articles and news related to the topic of research.

Data analysis is carried out using comparative analysis. Comparative research is research that compares. A form of descriptive study called comparative research aims to discover and examine the factors that contribute to the occurrence or emergence of a certain phenomenon.


A different definition of comparative research is a form of study that contrasts two nations, groups, or more than one variable (Nazir, 2009). This research compares both the nation's local political practices, notably the pattern of clientelism politics and patrimonialism bureaucracy.

Conceptual Framework

The diagram above provides a brief overview of the research flow (figure 1).

In the first stage, researchers briefly identify key features of clientelism, patrimonialism, and

neo-patrimonialism in order to gain a common understanding between researchers and readers. Second, the research reveals the impact of these practices, which are further categorized into ethnic politics, corruption, rent-seeking economy, and slow poverty reduction. We analyze them with case studies from the Philippines and Indonesia. This deductive flow allows researchers to ultimately synthesize the analysis and answer the research question of how clientelism and patrimonialism practices in both democratized Indonesia and the Philippines.



Source: Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this analysis, we would only focus on the democratization procedures and practices of clientelistic in the Philippines and Indonesian local politics. Both countries have been democratized, with the Philippine since the topple of Marcos' regime in 1986, while Indonesia began their reformation era for nearly 15 years, but through study conducted by Simanjuntak (2006) in Case (2009), Tahyar (2012), Cesar, et.al (2013) Montiel, de Leon (2003) Sidel (2005) and Hutchcroft (2001) both in Indonesia and in the Philippines, clientelism has not significantly dealt with. According to Scott (Pak Kimchoeun & Hornig, 2007), There are at least three ways in the introduction of democratic, rational-legal bureaucratic systems that change the nature of patronage relations: Elections strengthen a client's negotiating position with a patron by increasing his resources because the client's vote alone influences the success of the patron who is running for office. The vertical integration of patronage from the village level to the central government is also encouraged by election dynamics. As patrons compete for votes, it also encourages the growth of patronage networks and intensifies the politicization of current ties.

Clientelism and Patrimonial Practices

In spite of the changing nature mentioned above, direct election, democratization, and rational-legal do not necessarily change the one core nature of clientelism which is that of a loosely based relationship that will merely abandon once either party is not in need of the other's services. With this in mind, a political candidate will discontinue its clients once elected as long as its accountability is not to the voters rather than to other branches of government.

According to Simanjuntak's analysis, clientelism shows that clients' roles have significantly changed in recent research. Customers today are neither passive or uneducated; rather, they are actively enjoying the chances that political democracy has to offer. Clients support their patrons politically, and patrons mediate between their clients and the state by obtaining benefits like jobs and licenses. Election ballots are part of the currency of patron-client interactions (Simandjuntak, 2012).

Patrons distribute presents like clothing, groceries, and school construction rather than changing state institutions. Due to their lack of options and access to institutional sources of help, this is done to win the favor of the population's lowest class. The patronage system is frequently used by the lower social classes as a temporary fix to address their shared issues. Elites exploit public services to win citizens' votes despite their substandard conditions in order to provide a sense of legitimacy for their position (Simandjuntak, 2012).

Money is utilized in campaigns as a symbol of power as well as a means of gathering votes. Candidates give out money to win the support of potential voters. Money politics during elections represents the birth of patronage politics: gift-giving in exchange for political loyalty. Deasy Simanjuntak highlighted that the adoption of direct elections in Indonesian regions where the bureaucracy serves as the primary employment created patronage democracy, where the state holds the monopoly on jobs and services. Additionally, political leaders have substantial responsibility for implementing laws that distribute the employment and services available to the state (Simandjuntak, 2012).

Similarly the problems are two folds now, democratization in local politics of Indonesia has given power to the people to vote on which candidates they feel will best serve their interests once in power, however supervising government in regards of accountability, transparency and other good governance practices are not given to the voters. It is rather given to local legislators who had practiced the same clientelistic behavior in order to get elected during legislative election, representing political parties who precisely have clientelism political style.

The Philippines' 'Bossisms'

Comparing with what happens in the Philippines, similar practices occur. Such practices start when political campaign intensity is decided on the amount of money a candidate has – a candidate at the least has to exhaust on leaflets, advertisements, and pollster, a candidate also needs to pay for campaign managers, political leaders and even voters themselves - Montiel who researches on the Philippines political culture agrees that the most effective of method is patronage politics in obtaining votes.

“from the lens of the research participants, the traditional system of campaigning is most effective, especially with the poor. The traditional system employs patronage politics or living up to the cultural expectation that the politician should act as a patron. This means doling out money, and personally attending to any community or personal needs of one's constituents. Traditional politics is money-based politics.” (Montiel, 2012).

Another scholar who studied clientelism in the Philippines, John T. Sidel identified what he refers to as 'bossism' in which he explained:

“The Philippines is a weak state preyed upon by a powerful oligarchy that has an economic base largely independent of the state but depends upon access to the state machinery as the major means to accumulate wealth . . . (a) complex set of predatory mechanisms for the private exploitation and accumulation of the archipelago's human, natural, and monetary resources . . . (p)redatory power brokers who achieve monopolistic control over both coercive and economic resources within given territorial jurisdictions or bailiwicks” (Sidel, 2005).

He also highlighted the importance of coercive forms of control over local populations by demonstrating how coercion has consistently and continuously interfered with elections and altered economic and social linkages.

In relations with patron-client political behavior in the democratic era, we see how different practices occurred in local politics of Indonesia and the Philippines. While Indonesia's local politics practiced some similar form of clientelistic behavior in the Philippines during elections and throughout their office tenure by relying on patrons to attain votes, they were mostly reluctant to involve to any kind of political coercion - at least publicly. As Simanjuntak findings showed, violent behaviors are not means applied by candidates at local level.

In the Philippines, these type patronages are usually local strongmen relied by politicians to drive

voters to elect them. Although Indonesia's local politics are not immune to such practices, yet they tend not to be in the popular and very much carefully observed by election committee and supervising bodies, the police, civil society and political parties.

Oligarchic Patrimonialism

In the analysis of Paul Hutchcroft, patrimonialism practices in the Philippines oppose “administrative patrimonialism,” in which state bureaucrats are the main beneficiaries, is known as the term “oligarchic patrimonialism.” – this type of patrimonialism enable influential business oligarch to obtain privileges through largely incoherent bureaucracy practices. Economic growth alone may actually serve to strengthen the existing oligarchs, who have no reason to push for a more legal-rational political order that removes them of their special privilege. While a result, such a system need not decline as economic growth continues. (Lande, 2000).

Furthermore Paul Hutchcroft (Lande, 2000) distinguishes 'booty capitalism', or 'oligarchic patrimonialism' in which “a powerful oligarchic business class extracts privilege from a largely incoherent bureaucracy” with bureaucratic capitalism, the kind of rent capitalism practiced in nations like Thailand and Indonesia, where a bureaucratic elite exploits a vulnerable business class.

With this acknowledgement we understand how the two countries of Indonesia and the Philippines are dealing with both practices of both clientelism and patrimonialism or neo-patrimonialism in different types, which mostly have similar characteristics, resulting to the same result of practices to what Brikenhorff et.al. has stated, with perhaps different resentment to the process.

What the Philippines endure with 'bossisms' would be devastating if it occurs in Indonesia's democratic era, the diverse ethnic groups, religious distribution, and experience of violent conflicts in the past, will destabilize security of Indonesia as a whole. Coercion and local strongmen that inflicts violent to citizens are considered as politic behaviors of the past, expertly exemplified by military ruled of Suharto's New Order Regime.

Whilst patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism stem from the obvious clientelism approach to direct election in local election of Indonesia and the Philippines however different they were done, they still resulted the same: ethnic politics, corruption, rent-seeking economy and slow poverty reduction. The Philippines has the business groups benefited from the incompetent behavior of its bureaucrats, while in Indonesia, all the elites in the business groups oligarch, political parties, and bureaucrats are enjoying the reap benefits of these practices.

Characterized as tending towards centralism - amassed power on a certain political figures or political institutions – neo-patrimonialism with a certainty of separation of power in an established rational-legal bureaucratic system; however the real power are likely held by a small number of elites, be those who hold government positions, or part of the ruling party, or those who are closely connected to the ruler. This type of centralized patrimonialism or neo-patrimonialism are commonly practiced through the candidacy approval by national level power of political parties, dispensing patronage politics from national to local level all the way to rural areas. During local elections, candidates would come down and build their clientelist webs by giving materials gifts, infrastructures build up, all while national political leaders acknowledge these behaviors as contributions to their upcoming national elections.

In both Indonesia and the Philippines politics, political dynasty phenomenon emphasizes this statement, from national level unto the local politics, we would see such thing establishing, and thus democratization does more in trending towards this type of patron-client politics. It has been shown that these initiatives help to legitimize the current government by strengthening the rural political base.

In the previous section it has been shown that some form of clientelism-patrimonialism-neopatrimonialism practices still exist largely in Indonesia and the Philippines local politics, with a slight different variation. The Philippines has more economic disparity and underdeveloped state capacity, coined by the term “booty capitalism” and “oligarch clientelism”, striking disadvantage for the poor is shown from the owning of business oligarch taking benefit from this. This further worsened with “bossism”, strongmen broker that carry out mafia-like violence and coercive behavior. In terms of political campaign, both Indonesia and the Philippine’s use of traditional approach of patronage politics are mostly similar, and this does not limit to rural population, but also urban area, as long as they are deprived of resources.

In dealing with clientelism and patrimonialism with the effect of rent-seeking, corruption, ethnic politics, poverty reduction and tentative reform, this study has analyzed that in the Philippines and Indonesia local politics, while both still manage to develop better than places such as Africa or Latin America, these practices still pose problem to the access of ordinary citizens without clients to enter political arena. It was shown that both in Indonesia and the Philippines, patronage politics is very much marring the democratization process, economic development, welfare parity, and bureaucratic reform through practices of various kinds of clientelistic approach.

CONCLUSION

Upon the question on why democratization does not hinder the application of these approaches, we would pose not an exact answer as it would need further and more in depth than this study could reach. However we are not really convinced that democratization could be a strategy for the elimination of clientelism and patrimonialism, moreover we see meritocratic and Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy still existing in countries with clientelism and patronage politics, in countries such as Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, or in countries that do not need full-fledge democracy, such as Singapore and Malaysia. Even places like the United States and United Kingdom both classified as developed democracy are not completely void of clientelist political behavior, however unlike in Indonesia and the Philippines what ensue from behaviors of clientelism are not the type of bureaucracy practices that hinder public service delivery and patrimonialism or neo-patrimonialism corrupted bureaucracy. In this regard, we would have to disagree on Brikenhorff surefire-like panacea.

We also do not agree of the notion that political corruption occur due to approaches of clientelistic or patrimonialism, although it certainly does not help when transparency, accountability, and other values of good governance are lacking in bureaucratic polity. Thus we believe that the erection of civil service reform and the strengthening of the judicial apparatus and civil society are more of urgent in tackling this problem, patronage politics should not be a hinder to building a more parity development and equal justice towards access for citizens.

We are more convinced that in the countries that have clientelism practices yet do not have the effect of corruption or poverty reduction, has better economic welfare and higher education background. Montiel has said that traditional approach of patronage politics are only more effective when applying to the poor of citizens.

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