

## EVALUATING BAWASLU'S SiGapLapor FOR ELECTORAL JUSTICE IN INDONESIA'S 2024 ELECTION

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**ABSTRACT.** This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the Election Violation Handling and Reporting Information System (SiGapLapor) operated by Indonesia's Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) as a digital electoral oversight mechanism in the 2024 elections. Using an exploratory qualitative case study, the research draws on document analysis and semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with election supervisors and ICT administrators. The findings show that SiGapLapor demonstrates partial effectiveness. While it performs well as an internal administrative case management system, it remains limited as a participatory public reporting channel and as an instrument of electoral justice. This is reflected in the high attrition of citizen reports and the limited transparency of case outcomes. The system's performance is shaped by interrelated technical, organisational, and governance constraints, including a non-user-centred interface, reliance on manual verification, uneven regional capacity, and weak system integration. The findings suggest the need for citizen-centred system design, improved integration and case-tracking features, and strengthened institutional capacity to enhance public value.

**Keywords:** SiGapLapor; Bawaslu; digital election oversight; electoral justice; open government data

**ABSTRAK.** Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengevaluasi efektivitas Sistem Informasi Penanganan dan Pelaporan Pelanggaran Pemilu (SiGapLapor) yang dioperasikan oleh Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum (Bawaslu) sebagai mekanisme pengawasan pemilu digital pada Pemilu 2024. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan studi kasus kualitatif eksploratif melalui analisis dokumen serta wawancara semi-terstruktur dan diskusi kelompok terarah dengan pengawas pemilu dan pengelola TIK. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa SiGapLapor memiliki efektivitas parsial. Sistem ini berfungsi baik sebagai sistem manajemen kasus administratif internal, namun masih terbatas sebagai saluran pelaporan publik yang partisipatif dan sebagai instrumen keadilan pemilu. Hal ini tercermin dari tingginya attrition laporan masyarakat dan terbatasnya transparansi hasil penanganan kasus. Kinerja sistem dipengaruhi oleh faktor teknis, organisasional, dan tata kelola yang saling terkait, termasuk desain yang belum berpusat pada pengguna, dominasi verifikasi manual, ketimpangan kapasitas daerah, dan lemahnya integrasi sistem. Temuan ini menunjukkan perlunya perancangan sistem yang berpusat pada warga, penguatan integrasi dan pelacakan kasus, serta peningkatan kapasitas kelembagaan untuk memperkuat nilai publik.

**Kata kunci:** SiGapLapor; Bawaslu; pengawasan pemilu digital; keadilan pemilu; open government data

### INTRODUCTION

Digital transformation in public governance has become a central agenda in many countries, including Indonesia. The use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in elections is often expected to strengthen transparency, accountability, and citizen participation. Comparative studies across countries suggest that well-designed internet use can help enhance electoral integrity and public trust in electoral institutions (Asimakopoulous et al., 2025; Stockemer, 2018).

In Indonesia, the General Elections Commission (KPU) and the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) are key actors in electoral ICT adoption, ranging from electronic recapitulation to election data portals and digital oversight channels. Research on digital democracy in Indonesia indicates that election technologies correlate with changes in voter participation and campaign management (Imawan, 2023). Recent studies on digital governance also

show a rapid expansion of research in developing countries, although the focus remains fragmented (Prabawa et al., 2024).

A major innovation introduced by Bawaslu for the 2024 electoral cycle is the Election Violation Handling and Reporting Information System (SiGapLapor), an online reporting platform regulated under Bawaslu Regulation No. 7 of 2022 on the Handling of Findings and Reports of Election Violations and launched on 31 October 2022. Conceptually, SiGapLapor is designed to: (1) enable participatory oversight by allowing citizens to submit documented reports of alleged violations; (2) serve as an internal case-handling and monitoring tool across supervisory levels; and (3) expand electoral participation by widening access and citizen involvement in safeguarding electoral integrity. This orientation aligns with open government data (OGD) frameworks that emphasise system quality, information quality, and public value (Bawaslu RI, 2022b; Purwanto et al., 2017, 2018, 2020).

However, SiGapLapor's implementation during the 2024 Election still faces fundamental issues that limit its role as an inclusive public complaints mechanism. These include uneven public outreach that keeps usage largely internal, technical constraints such as server instability and uneven regional infrastructure readiness, a user interface and workflow that are not sufficiently user-friendly, largely manual verification processes, limited ability to capture case complexity, limited data openness, and constraints in local human resource capacity. These challenges reflect broader findings in the literature, which highlight a persistent gap between the promises of digitalisation and actual service performance (Benmohamed et al., 2024; Janssen et al., 2012; Simonofski et al., 2022).

These implementation challenges are closely tied to electoral justice and electoral integrity in the digital era. ICT can improve election quality, but it also introduces new risks that must be governed, including unequal access, data security vulnerabilities, and challenges of transparency and accountability throughout the electoral cycle (Garnett & James, 2020; Haque & Carroll, 2020; Stockemer, 2018). More specifically, scholarship on election technology ethics stresses that public trust depends on procedural transparency and the protection of voters' rights, whether in studies of e-voting regulation in Canada (Essex & Goodman, 2020) or analyses of public trust in Indonesia's 2024 e-recapitulation (Sirekap) (Paskarina et al., 2025). As a digital oversight system, SiGapLapor should therefore ensure fair access to reporting, clear follow-up pathways, and adequate protection for reporters and evidence.

The open government and OGD literature provides an important lens for situating SiGapLapor within Indonesia's electoral governance ecosystem. OGD studies emphasise that initiative success depends on the interplay of system quality, data quality, user participation, and institutional capacity, as well as the ability to bridge the "promise-practice" gap (Benmohamed et al., 2024; Janssen et al., 2012; Ruijter & Meijer, 2020). In Indonesia, research shows that election OGD can create public value and encourage civic engagement, but only when portal design, information quality, and engagement mechanisms match the needs of non-expert users (Purwanto et al., 2017, 2020). In parallel, the Digital-Era Governance (DEG) perspective highlights process reintegration, citizen-based holism, and end-to-end digitalisation; accordingly, SiGapLapor should be developed as part of an integrated digital governance architecture rather than as a standalone application (Dunleavy et al., 2006)

Bibliometric evidence further suggests that research on digital governance and OGD continues to focus on broad themes such as transparency, participation, and accountability, while more specific areas including election oversight and violation-handling systems remain underexplored (Afandi et al., 2023, 2024). In Indonesia, studies of election digitalisation likewise tend to emphasise organiser technologies such as candidate administration and e-recapitulation, rather than oversight systems (Imawan, 2023; Siregar & Suryono, 2025; Tinanto et al., 2024). Consequently, digital complaint-handling systems such as SiGapLapor remain insufficiently examined from an integrated perspective combining information systems, electoral integrity, and DEG.

Based on the state of the art, three key research gaps can be identified. First, the international literature on ICT and electoral integrity has largely focused on e-voting, social media, and disinformation, while empirical evaluations of oversight and violation-handling systems particularly in developing democracies remain limited (Garnett & James, 2020; Haque & Carroll, 2020; Stockemer, 2018). Second, OGD and digital governance research in Indonesia has often centred on KPU and election data, while Bawaslu's oversight dimension through SiGapLapor has rarely been positioned as a core digital infrastructure for electoral justice (Purwanto et al., 2017, 2020; Sa'adah & Pramono, 2025). Third, existing studies on Bawaslu remain dominated by normative-legal approaches and have not sufficiently integrated information-system evaluation with electoral integrity and DEG perspectives (Afandi et al., 2023, 2024; Prabawa et al., 2024).

This is where the article's scientific novelty lies. Theoretically, it integrates three frameworks that are rarely combined—case management information systems (CMIS)/e-justice, electoral justice–electoral integrity, and Digital-Era Governance while positioning them within a more focused bibliometric context. Empirically, it provides an in-depth case study of a digital complaint and reporting system within an election supervisory body (Bawaslu) (Bawaslu RI, 2022a), complementing Indonesia's digital governance literature that has more often highlighted election administration systems and open election data.

On the basis of this background and the identified gaps, the study poses three research questions: (1) to what extent has SiGapLapor functioned effectively as an election violation case-handling information system and a public reporting channel in the 2024 Election; (2) what technical, organisational, and governance factors hinder or

support its use in promoting transparency and electoral justice; and (3) what development direction is required for SiGapLapor toward the 2029 Election to address electoral integrity challenges, taking into account findings from digital governance and OGD research.

Based on these research questions, this study aims to: (1) assess the effectiveness of SiGapLapor as an election violation case-handling information system and a public reporting channel in the 2024 Election; (2) identify the technical, organisational, and governance factors that constrain or enable its use; and (3) formulate recommendations for its development toward the 2029 Election so that it becomes more citizen-centric, integrated, and oriented toward public value creation.

## METHOD

This study adopted an exploratory qualitative case-study design to examine how SiGapLapor was implemented and used during Indonesia's 2024 simultaneous elections. An interpretivist perspective was employed to understand actors' meanings, experiences, and organisational practices surrounding the system in its real-world institutional context (Willig, 2008). SiGapLapor was selected as the case of this study because it represents a major digital innovation introduced by Bawaslu in the 2024 electoral cycle and occupies a strategic position at the intersection of election oversight, public complaint handling, and digital governance. The case is therefore analytically relevant for examining not only how a digital reporting platform functions administratively, but also how it performs as a mechanism for participatory oversight and electoral justice. In addition, the 2024 election provided a timely empirical setting because it was the first national electoral cycle in which SiGapLapor was used extensively across multiple supervisory levels.

Participants were recruited purposively in order to capture information-rich perspectives from actors directly involved in the development, administration, supervision, and operational use of SiGapLapor. The recruitment process began by identifying institutional roles most closely connected to the system, including election supervisors, ICT administrators, and policy or monitoring personnel. Potential informants were then selected based on their level of involvement, organisational position, and representation across different administrative tiers of Bawaslu. This strategy was intended to ensure variation in perspectives between national, provincial, and regency/municipal levels, while

still focusing on actors with first-hand knowledge of the platform's implementation. In total, 12 key informants participated: 7 election supervisors, 4 ICT administrators, and 1 policy/monitoring officer. They represented the national level (n=2), provincial level (n=4), and regency/municipal level (n=6). The sample comprised 7 men and 5 women, aged 27–55 years, with 3–17 years of professional experience in election administration and oversight. Consistent with Azwar (2007), basic demographic and role-related information—such as institutional level, gender, age group, highest education, and years of service—was recorded to contextualise participants' perspectives.

Data were generated from two main sources: document analysis and qualitative interviews/FGD. The documentary materials included regulations, technical guidelines and standard operating procedures, internal performance reports, supervision summaries, meeting minutes, evaluation notes, and presentation materials related to the 2024 election cycle and the operation of SiGapLapor. These documents were used not only to reconstruct the formal design and regulatory basis of the platform, but also to compare official expectations with actual implementation practices described by participants. Primary qualitative data were collected through semi-structured interviews and one focus group discussion conducted between May and October 2024. Sessions were held in hybrid form, combining online and in-person meetings, and generally lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. With informed consent, all sessions were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim, and identifying details were removed during data processing to protect confidentiality.

The analysis followed an exploratory qualitative strategy (Willig, 2008) and proceeded iteratively across the full dataset. In the first stage, all transcripts and documents were read repeatedly to achieve familiarity with the material and to identify recurrent issues related to system use, implementation barriers, and governance dynamics. Initial coding was then conducted line by line, combining deductive categories derived from the study's conceptual framework—such as citizen-centricity, service integration, data openness, and electoral justice—with inductive codes emerging directly from the data, including usability problems, verification practices, infrastructure limitations, uneven local capacity, and reporting bottlenecks. In the second stage, related codes were grouped, compared, and refined into broader thematic patterns. This process involved examining similarities and differences across organisational levels and participant roles in

order to identify which factors enabled or constrained SiGapLapor's effectiveness. Analytic memos were written throughout the process to record coding decisions, emerging interpretations, and links between empirical findings and the theoretical framework. This two-cycle coding process strengthened analytic rigour by making explicit how the study moved from raw qualitative material to higher-level thematic interpretation and final recommendations.

To enhance trustworthiness, the study applied several qualitative quality strategies. Credibility was strengthened through triangulation between documentary evidence and participant accounts, as well as through cross-checking interpretations across multiple sources and institutional levels. Dependability was supported by maintaining an audit trail of coding decisions, theme development, and analytic memos. Peer debriefing was also used during analysis to test emerging interpretations, challenge assumptions, and improve analytic coherence. Transferability was supported through a thick description of the institutional setting, the election oversight context, and the operational environment in which SiGapLapor was implemented. Participation was voluntary and based on informed consent, and confidentiality was protected through transcript anonymisation and the secure storage of research materials.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### Effectiveness of SiGapLapor as a Violation Case-Handling System (RQ1)

Indonesia's 2024 simultaneous elections marked an early milestone in the digital transformation of election oversight through the adoption of SiGapLapor, an online reporting platform developed by Bawaslu RI. Rather than treating the platform as a purely technical artefact, this study approaches SiGapLapor as a socio-technical governance intervention whose value depends on how its workflows convert civic inputs into accountable institutional action. Contemporary Scopus-indexed digital government scholarship argues that citizen-centricity and public value are not delivered by portals per se; rather, they emerge when service design, organisational capacity, and feedback loops are aligned with citizens' capabilities and accountability expectations.

Analytically, SiGapLapor is evaluated as a hybrid of a public reporting channel and an internal Case Management Information System (CMIS) for documenting, verifying, and classifying alleged violations. To improve structural clarity, the

discussion is organised directly around the study's research questions.




Figure 1. is presented here for analytical purposes; in the final manuscript, it should be replaced with a higher-resolution version to improve legibility and support closer interpretation.

Based on the dashboard data, citizen-submitted reports (approximately 3,800) exceed supervisor-initiated findings (approximately 1,800), suggesting that the platform reduced initial barriers to participation and enabled greater civic input than internal discovery alone. However, the status panel reveals a steep report-to-case attrition: nearly 1,800 submissions are labelled *Unregistered*, around 2,000 are *Registered*, and fewer than 1,000 remain *In Process*. The outcome panel reinforces this interpretation, with more than 2,000 cases categorised as *Non-Violation* and only about 1,000 determined to be *Violations*.

These distributions indicate that SiGapLapor currently functions more reliably as an administrative recording and classification system than as a citizen-facing complaint mechanism that consistently resolves and explains alleged harms. The dominant value created so far is administrative visibility rather than reciprocal accountability and learning for complainants.

A plausible explanation for this pattern is the mismatch between how citizens frame perceived unfairness and how institutions must legally code violations. When reporting interfaces do not provide sufficient scaffolding, such as plain-language eligibility criteria, guided evidence prompts, and explainable status progression, attrition increases because many submissions are incomplete, misclassified, outside scope, or unverifiable.

A deeper reading of these dashboard patterns suggests that the central problem is not the absence of participation, but the weak institutional conversion of participation into recognisable justice outcomes. In digital governance terms, SiGapLapor has succeeded in creating a relatively low-threshold intake channel, yet it has not fully established

what public-administration scholars call a closed accountability loop. Citizens can submit reports, but many cannot easily understand what happens next, why a case is screened out, how legal qualification is determined, or whether a reported harm has resulted in any corrective action. This weakens the democratic value of the platform because citizens do not merely seek the opportunity to submit data; they seek acknowledgement, explanation, and a sense that the institution treats their complaint as part of a meaningful justice process. The distinction is important. A reporting portal may look participatory when measured only by submission volume, but from an electoral justice perspective it becomes effective only when the reporting process produces procedural clarity, fair treatment, and intelligible outcomes for users.

This finding is consistent with broader debates in open government and digital-era governance. OGD research has repeatedly shown that the publication or collection of information does not automatically create transparency, because transparency depends on whether information is understandable, reusable, and connected to decision-making processes (Janssen et al., 2012; Ruijter & Meijer, 2020). Likewise, citizen-centric digital government requires more than digitising an existing bureaucratic workflow; it requires redesigning the workflow around the user's journey, cognitive needs, and expectations of feedback (Simonofski et al., 2022; Sundberg & Holmström, 2024). In SiGapLapor, the reporting architecture still appears to reflect the logic of internal legal-administrative screening more strongly than the logic of public engagement. As a result, the system is relatively strong in registering cases into an institutional pipeline, but less strong in translating legal procedure into plain-language guidance that ordinary users can follow. This imbalance helps explain why participation can be numerically visible while substantively fragile.

Another analytical implication concerns the relationship between access and fairness. At first glance, the presence of thousands of citizen reports may suggest improved equality of access, since digital reporting can reduce geographic and temporal barriers. However, access in electoral justice is not exhausted by the ability to click 'submit'. Fair access also requires informational accessibility, evidence accessibility, and procedural accessibility. Citizens need to know what kind of conduct qualifies as a reportable violation, what evidence is sufficient, what deadlines apply, and what standards will be used to assess the report. When these elements are unclear, digital access can paradoxically reproduce inequality,

because users with higher legal literacy, better internet access, or closer proximity to Bawaslu officers are more likely to navigate the system successfully. Thus, the attrition visible in the dashboard should not be interpreted simply as proof that many public reports are weak; it may also indicate that the platform places a significant interpretive burden on citizens before their grievance can be recognised within the formal electoral justice system.



Source: SiGapLapor website (Bawaslu), 2024

**Figure 2.** likewise requires a higher-resolution version in the final manuscript so that category labels and comparative values can be interpreted more accurately.

The figure provides a more specific example in the area of civil-servant neutrality. The appearance of a "No Title Available" category suggests a data-structuring problem: some reports are not consistently labelled in ways that support public interpretation and comparative analysis. Although Bawaslu provides access to more detailed information at national, provincial, and district/city levels, digital transparency produces public value only when information is searchable, interpretable, and actionable for non-expert users.

Taken together, the findings for RQ1 show that SiGapLapor has achieved partial effectiveness: it performs relatively well as an internal case-handling system, but remains limited as a participatory public reporting channel and as an instrument of electoral justice.

Viewed from a CMIS perspective, this partial effectiveness is understandable. Case-management systems are often first optimised for standardisation, traceability, and administrative control, especially in institutions handling large volumes of time-sensitive cases. In such settings, designers frequently privilege internal needs such as categorisation, hierarchical verification, and status control. These features are valuable because electoral oversight bodies must work under legal deadlines and procedural constraints. Yet when a CMIS also functions as a public complaints platform, an unresolved tension emerges between bureaucratic efficiency and communicative transparency. SiGapLapor illustrates this tension clearly: it helps the institution organise incoming allegations, but it does not yet fully communicate the logic of case progression back to the reporting public. The result is a system that is procedurally useful for administrators while remaining only partially legible for citizens.

In this sense, the study refines the meaning of ‘effectiveness’ for digital oversight systems. Effectiveness should not be equated with the volume of reports, the existence of a dashboard, or the fact that cases are logged digitally. A more comprehensive evaluation requires at least four dimensions: intake accessibility, procedural intelligibility, institutional responsiveness, and public traceability of outcomes. SiGapLapor performs relatively well on the first and, to some extent, on the second from the institution’s internal perspective. However, its performance is weaker on the third and fourth dimensions when assessed from the citizen’s perspective. This multidimensional reading matters because digital electoral oversight is inherently both administrative and democratic. It must serve internal case handling while also building public trust that reporting mechanisms are fair, understandable, and consequential.

## **Technical, Organisational, and Governance Constraints (RQ2)**

### ***Technical constraints***

Technically, the system faces limitations including server instability, a complex interface, reliance on manual verification, and limited citizen-readable tracking. These issues increase reporting errors and reinforce dependence on procedural filtering mechanisms.

The technical issues identified by participants should be read not as isolated IT defects but as governance-relevant frictions embedded in the architecture of public service delivery. Server instability, cumbersome user flows, and limited status

tracking may appear operational, yet they shape who is able to report, how accurately they can do so, and whether they remain engaged with the process. A platform that is difficult to navigate does not fail neutrally; it tends to disadvantage first-time users, people with lower digital literacy, and complainants operating under time pressure. In the election context, where violations may need to be reported quickly and supported with specific evidence, even minor usability burdens can materially affect justice outcomes. This is why the citizen-centricity literature treats usability not as a cosmetic matter but as a precondition for equitable service access (Dechamps et al., 2025; O’Grady & Mangina, 2025).

In addition, the persistence of manual verification is analytically significant because it reveals a hybrid governance model in which digitisation has advanced at the intake stage but not yet across the full decision chain. Hybrid arrangements are common in public-sector digital transformation, especially where legal accountability requires human judgement (Afzal & Panagiotopoulos, 2024). However, when the digital front end raises expectations of speed and clarity while the back end remains heavily manual, users may perceive the system as opaque or inconsistent. For SiGapLapor, manual verification may be institutionally necessary to protect due process and evidentiary integrity, but its dominance also slows feedback loops and reduces the visibility of why some reports move forward while others stop. The implication is not that human review should be removed, but that the system should make human review more transparent, better documented, and easier for citizens to understand.

### ***Organisational constraints***

Organisationally, uneven staffing and ICT competence across regions affect how SiGapLapor is used in practice. In many cases, the system is treated more as an administrative obligation than as a strategic instrument for public accountability, resulting in compliance-oriented practices and limited responsiveness.

### ***Governance constraints***

From a governance perspective, SiGapLapor remains weakly integrated within the broader electoral justice ecosystem. Limited interoperability between reporting, verification, adjudication, and enforcement processes constrains traceability and reduces accountability.

Overall, these findings indicate that SiGapLapor’s limitations are not merely technical, but reflect deeper socio-technical misalignment

between system design, organisational capacity, and governance integration.

The organisational dimension is equally important because technology adoption in public institutions is always mediated by routines, incentives, and uneven local capacity. The interviews suggest that SiGapLapor is not used within a uniform organisational environment; rather, it is filtered through varied provincial and district realities. Regions with stronger ICT support, more experienced supervisors, and better workload management are likely to use the system more consistently and to generate cleaner administrative records. By contrast, units operating under staffing shortages or weaker technical support may treat the platform as a secondary compliance requirement, entering data only to satisfy formal reporting obligations. This pattern echoes digital governance scholarship showing that the same technology can produce different outcomes depending on frontline adaptation, organisational learning, and local implementation culture (Mutiarin et al., 2024; Afzal & Panagiotopoulos, 2024).

The governance constraint goes further by revealing that SiGapLapor is still insufficiently embedded in an end-to-end electoral justice ecosystem. A public report enters one segment of the oversight chain, but the wider chain includes verification, recommendation, adjudication, sanctioning, and follow-up by other actors or systems. When these stages are not interoperable, digital oversight becomes fragmented. Citizens encounter one portal, while the institution internally traverses multiple procedural worlds that are not transparently connected. This fragmentation weakens accountability because neither citizens nor, in some cases, supervisors can easily reconstruct the full pathway from complaint to outcome. The Digital-Era Governance perspective is helpful here: reintegration is not only an administrative efficiency goal, but also a democratic one, because integrated processes reduce duplication, clarify responsibility, and make outcomes easier to track across institutional boundaries (Dunleavy et al., 2006; Margetts & Dunleavy, 2013).

Taken together, these constraints demonstrate that SiGapLapor should be understood as a socio-technical system whose limitations emerge from interaction effects rather than from single-point failures. A non-intuitive interface increases incomplete submissions; incomplete submissions intensify manual verification; heavy manual verification magnifies the consequences of uneven regional capacity; and weak inter-system integration makes the entire chain harder to explain to users. These mutually reinforcing constraints

help explain why a system can appear functionally active yet still deliver limited public value. Thus, improving SiGapLapor requires more than technical maintenance. It requires coordinated reform across design, staffing, workflow, and inter-organisational governance so that the system's digital front end is matched by institutional capability behind it.

## Development Pathways toward the 2029 Election (RQ3)

### *Citizen-centred redesign*

First, the system should be redesigned to reduce cognitive burden through simplified reporting forms, plain-language guidance, and mobile-friendly interfaces. This would improve report quality and reduce attrition.

A citizen-centred redesign should begin with the reporting journey rather than with the institution's internal filing logic. From the user's perspective, the key questions are simple: what happened, does it count as a violation, what evidence should be attached, where is my case now, and what decision has been taken? The interface should therefore organise information around plain-language tasks and decision support, not around legal categories that are obvious only to trained election supervisors. Guided forms, dynamic prompts, examples of acceptable evidence, and warning notices about jurisdictional or evidentiary gaps could reduce avoidable screening failures. Mobile optimisation is also essential because many citizen interactions with public services in Indonesia take place through smartphones rather than desktop interfaces. A redesigned intake process should therefore minimise typing burden, allow staged completion where legally possible, and present status updates in concise, user-readable language.

Importantly, citizen-centred redesign does not mean abandoning legal precision. The challenge is translation, not simplification in the sense of weakening standards. Legal categories can remain intact in the back-end architecture while the front-end interface translates them into ordinary language and intuitive user steps. This distinction matters because many digital government failures stem from attempting to mirror bureaucratic forms directly into online platforms. What is legally necessary for administrators is not always cognitively manageable for citizens. A stronger design principle would treat the reporting form as an assisted pathway that helps users move from lived experience to legally processable information. In that sense, redesign is an issue of democratic accessibility: it allows more citizens to articulate grievances in a form that the institution can fairly evaluate.

### ***Strengthening tracking, integration, and OGD orientation***

Second, the system should strengthen end-to-end tracking and integration. This includes clear status progression, explainable decision outcomes, and interoperability with related systems, supported by an open government data approach.

The second development pathway concerns end-to-end tracking, interoperability, and a more mature OGD orientation. At present, the system appears to provide visibility at the aggregate dashboard level, but the user experience of case progression remains limited. A stronger architecture would allow reporters and authorised internal actors to follow a clearer sequence of statuses, each accompanied by brief explanations of what the status means, what action has been taken, and what the next possible step is. Even when legal confidentiality restricts the disclosure of some details, there is still ample room to improve procedural explainability. For example, a case marked as unregistered or non-violation should ideally include standardised reasons that can be presented in citizen-readable language. This would convert the system from a passive repository into an educative accountability instrument.

An OGD-oriented reform would also improve the public value of SiGapLapor beyond individual complainants. Aggregated, well-structured, and interpretable data on violation types, geographic distribution, processing times, and outcomes can support journalists, researchers, civil society organisations, and political stakeholders in monitoring patterns of electoral risk. However, open data only creates value when datasets are cleanly labelled, searchable, and accompanied by sufficient metadata. The appearance of ambiguous labels such as “No Title Available” signals the opposite problem: data may be technically public but analytically weak. Therefore, strengthening data governance is not a secondary technical task; it is central to whether SiGapLapor contributes to transparency, policy learning, and preventive oversight. Better data structure would also enable Bawaslu to use the platform not only reactively, to process reports, but proactively, to identify recurring violation patterns and target supervisory interventions more effectively.

### ***Institutional capacity building and co-creation***

Third, organisational capacity must be strengthened through training, process redesign, and workload management. Co-creation with civil society and civic-tech communities can further enhance usability and legitimacy.

The third pathway, institutional capacity building and co-creation, is crucial because no digital platform can compensate for weak organisational readiness. Training should go beyond procedural operation of the application and include user-oriented communication, evidence assessment consistency, data quality control, and the interpretation of dashboard outputs for supervisory strategy. Capacity building is particularly important at subnational levels where workload pressures can be intense and ICT support uneven. Organisational reforms may also need to address role clarity: who is responsible for first-line assistance to citizens, who validates data quality, who monitors unresolved cases, and how lessons from recurrent reporting problems are fed back into system improvement. Without such process ownership, digital tools often become technically available but institutionally underused.

Co-creation can strengthen both usability and legitimacy. Civic-tech communities, election-monitoring organisations, journalists, disability advocates, and user representatives can help Bawaslu test whether the system is understandable in practice, not just compliant in principle. Participatory redesign workshops or iterative user testing could reveal friction points that internal administrators may overlook, such as confusing terminology, inaccessible navigation, or uncertainty about evidence submission. Co-creation is especially relevant in electoral oversight because legitimacy depends not only on procedural correctness but also on public confidence that the mechanism is fair and open to scrutiny. By involving external stakeholders in controlled and well-governed ways, Bawaslu could strengthen trust while also benefiting from practical design feedback. This would align the platform more closely with the public value orientation highlighted in the digital government literature (Panagiotopoulos et al., 2019; Twizeyimana & Andersson, 2019).

**These pathways aim to transform SiGapLapor from an administrative tool into a citizen-oriented, transparent, and accountable digital oversight system.**

### **Synthesis: Implications for Electoral Justice**

SiGapLapor represents progress in the digitalisation of election oversight, but its contribution to electoral justice remains limited. The core issue is the absence of an end-to-end accountability loop that connects citizen input with transparent institutional outcomes.

From an electoral justice perspective, participation remains “input-heavy but outcome-

light,” while accountability mechanisms remain difficult for citizens to interpret.

Without improvements in usability, feedback mechanisms, system integration, and institutional capacity, SiGapLapor risks remaining a symbolic innovation rather than a transformative governance instrument.

The 2029 election should therefore be used as a strategic opportunity to reposition SiGapLapor as a democratic digital oversight infrastructure that is citizen-centred, transparent, and capable of strengthening electoral justice in Indonesia.

The study also contributes an integrated framework for analysing election technology by showing that complaint-handling platforms mediate reports, evidence, and remedies, not merely administrative intake. Combining the CMIS/e-justice lens, the electoral integrity lens, and Digital-Era Governance clarifies that these platforms are pivotal sites where administrative design and democratic accountability intersect, particularly in developing democracies that are expanding digital infrastructure without yet embedding it fully in citizen-centred accountability frameworks.

These limitations also point to valuable avenues for future research. One priority is user-centred inquiry focused directly on citizens who attempted to submit reports, including those whose reports were rejected, discontinued, or reclassified. Such research could clarify where users experience the greatest cognitive burden, what kinds of evidence they struggle to provide, and how they interpret the fairness of institutional responses. Another promising direction is comparative research across digital electoral systems, for example between oversight platforms such as SiGapLapor and administrative platforms such as Sirekap or candidate-management systems. Comparative work would help identify whether the constraints observed here are specific to complaint handling or reflect broader characteristics of digital election governance in Indonesia.

Several limitations should be acknowledged. First, this study is based on an exploratory qualitative case study and therefore prioritises interpretive depth over statistical generalisation. Second, although the study covered multiple institutional levels and combined interviews with document analysis, it reflects supervisory and administrative perspectives more strongly than those of ordinary citizen-reporters. Third, the analysis is tied to the 2024 election cycle, whose workload, political dynamics, and digital practices may differ from future elections.

## Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Fourth, institutional reform should be accompanied by a differentiated capacity-building strategy. The study indicates that regional disparities matter. That suggests the need for targeted rather than uniform intervention. Provinces or districts with heavier caseloads, weaker infrastructure, or lower ICT confidence may require more intensive training, live support during election peaks, and simplified escalation procedures. Capacity building should therefore cover not only technical operation of the platform but also data quality standards, public communication practices, evidence handling, and cross-unit coordination. Without this organisational layer, even a technically improved system may continue to reproduce unequal performance.

Third, the study points to the importance of interoperability across the wider electoral-justice chain. A mature digital oversight infrastructure should ideally connect complaint intake, verification, investigation, adjudication, and outcome publication in ways that preserve traceability while respecting privacy and evidentiary safeguards. At present, SiGapLapor seems to function more as a bounded reporting and administrative registry than as a genuinely end-to-end justice architecture. Developing stronger integration with related supervisory, legal, and archival processes would reduce duplication, improve monitoring, and support more consistent institutional memory across electoral cycles. It would also make post-election evaluation easier, because researchers and policymakers could more readily identify where reports are filtered out, delayed, or transformed procedurally.

Second, stronger procedural explainability is needed. The public value of case management increases when users can see not only the current status of a report but also the reasons for movement or non-movement between statuses. Even a short plain-language explanation—such as insufficient documentary evidence, lack of jurisdiction, duplicate report, or issue resolved through another mechanism—would significantly improve accountability. Explainability is particularly important in contested democratic settings because institutions are judged not only by what they decide but by whether their decisions appear reasoned and consistent. In the absence of explainable outcomes, classifications such as Non-Violation or Unregistered risk being interpreted as arbitrary or dismissive, even when they are legally justified.

From a reform perspective, the evidence implies that improvement should proceed through layered

intervention rather than isolated technological fixes. First, Bawaslu would benefit from distinguishing more clearly between the needs of internal professional users and the needs of public users. A single system can still serve both groups, but the interface logic should not assume that citizens possess the same procedural literacy as supervisors. Guided reporting flows, simplified legal categories, contextual examples of acceptable evidence, and automatic checks for incomplete submissions could help reduce the current gap between complaint intention and complaint admissibility. Such features would not replace legal assessment, but they would improve the quality of citizen input and reduce avoidable attrition.

### Implications for Institutional Reform

The Indonesian electoral setting also adds a temporal dimension that is analytically significant. Elections are cyclical, high-pressure, and deadline-driven. Complaint systems in this context face compressed timelines, surges of volume, and heightened political scrutiny. These conditions make interface clarity, evidence guidance, and workflow interoperability more important than in routine public-service systems. A confusing or weakly integrated platform during a short electoral period does not merely inconvenience users; it may result in reports arriving too late, evidence being inadequately organised, or procedural opportunities being lost. Therefore, digital oversight systems for elections must be designed not just for formal compliance, but for temporal resilience under peak-load conditions.

This point resonates with a wider body of Indonesian public-administration experience, in which complaint-handling and transparency portals often succeed symbolically at the centre but encounter performance gaps in local use. SiGapLapor differs from general public-complaint systems because it is embedded in a politically sensitive domain where timing, evidence, and legal classification matter intensely. Even so, it shares a familiar challenge: the distance between formal digital availability and substantively equal digital usability. In this respect, the study reinforces the argument that citizen-centricity is not equivalent to merely providing a public-facing form. A system becomes citizen-centric only when it reduces interpretive burden, clarifies institutional expectations, and offers feedback that ordinary users can act upon without requiring insider knowledge.

In the Indonesian context, this issue is especially significant because election oversight operates across a territorially extensive and administratively uneven governance landscape. Digital solutions are often promoted as tools that can overcome distance,

standardise procedure, and reduce discretionary inconsistency. However, the present study indicates that digital standardisation is constrained by uneven local capacity, infrastructure variability, and differences in institutional interpretation across levels. This means that a single platform may not actually generate uniform experiences. Instead, the same interface can produce different practical realities depending on staffing levels, ICT confidence, supervisory workload, and local organisational culture. The implication is that national-level digital reform cannot rely on software deployment alone; it must also address implementation ecology, including training, support mechanisms, escalation protocols, and the distribution of technical assistance.

### Comparative Insight and the Indonesian Governance Context

The findings also suggest that electoral justice in the digital era should be understood as a relational process rather than a purely legal end point. In conventional legal-administrative thinking, justice is often associated with the final determination of whether a violation did or did not occur. Yet in digitally mediated oversight systems, perceptions of fairness are shaped much earlier and more continuously. Citizens evaluate fairness when they encounter the interface, when they try to interpret categories, when they upload evidence, when they receive or fail to receive status updates, and when they attempt to understand why a case was discontinued or reclassified. A system that provides a formally correct outcome but poor procedural communication may still weaken trust. Accordingly, the contribution of SiGapLapor to electoral justice cannot be measured only by the number of registered cases or sanctions produced; it must also be assessed in terms of whether it supports understandable, reviewable, and socially legible processes.

This insight is theoretically important because it qualifies a common assumption in digital governance research, namely that greater access to online channels necessarily strengthens accountability. Access is only the first layer of accountability. A citizen may be able to submit a report digitally, yet still remain excluded from meaningful redress if the subsequent process is opaque, highly legalistic, or weakly communicated. For that reason, the democratic value of a reporting platform should be assessed across at least four linked stages: access to submission, admissibility and verification, traceability of procedural movement, and intelligibility of final outcomes. SiGapLapor appears relatively strong at the first stage and moderately functional at the second for internal actors, but much

weaker at the third and fourth from the perspective of external users. This unevenness helps explain why a platform may appear successful in institutional dashboards while still generating frustration or disengagement among citizens.

Beyond the immediate operational evaluation of SiGapLapor, the findings also illuminate a broader institutional dilemma in contemporary digital electoral governance. Many public-sector platforms are introduced with a dual promise: to improve bureaucratic efficiency and to democratise access. In practice, however, these two goals do not automatically reinforce one another. A platform can become highly useful for internal administration while remaining only partially meaningful for ordinary citizens. The SiGapLapor case shows exactly this tension. Its present design appears more mature in supporting institutional recording, routing, and classification than in ensuring that members of the public can understand whether their complaint is admissible, how it is processed, what evidentiary standards are being applied, and what outcome has been produced. In other words, digitalisation has improved the visibility of procedural inputs more than the intelligibility of procedural justice. This distinction is crucial because electoral justice depends not only on whether institutions act, but also on whether citizens can recognise that action as fair, comprehensible, and responsive.

## CONCLUSION

This study evaluates the effectiveness of SiGapLapor as a digital election violation reporting and case-handling system in Indonesia's 2024 elections. The findings show that SiGapLapor demonstrates partial effectiveness: it performs well as an internal administrative system but remains limited as a participatory public reporting mechanism and as an instrument of electoral justice.

In relation to RQ1, the platform is more effective in generating administrative visibility than in ensuring citizen-oriented accountability, as many reports do not translate into traceable outcomes. Regarding RQ2, its performance is shaped by interrelated technical, organisational, and governance constraints, including a non-user-centred design, manual verification, uneven capacity, and limited system integration.

For RQ3, three development priorities are identified: a citizen-centred redesign, stronger tracking and system integration, and enhanced institutional capacity. These are necessary to transform SiGapLapor into a more transparent, responsive, and accountable system.

Overall, the study highlights that digitalisation alone is insufficient; meaningful improvements in electoral oversight require alignment between technology, organisational capacity, and public value. In practical terms, the next phase of reform should focus not only on digitising more procedures, but on making digital oversight more understandable, traceable, and publicly accountable.

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